COMMENTS
Hanna v. Plumer: An Expanded Concept of Federal Common LawA Requiem for Erie?
The Supreme Court posited a constitutional and statutory command to the federal courts to apply the federal rules in all cases,
thereby obviating Erie's impairment of federal procedural uniformity. Moreover, the Court's rationale arguably confers such
scope to "federal common law" as nearly to negate Erie'srigid circumscription of federal law-making power. However, the federal
court's application of federal, rather than state, law is limited by
the "fairness" requirements of due process of law.

T

reallocation of judicial rule-making power between the state and federal courts brought about by the nearly
simultaneous promulgation of the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 precipitated a conHE FUNDAMENTAL

1304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 14 U.S. (16 Pet.) 166 (1842)). The
evolution of the Erie doctrine has become common legal parlance. The basic statute
construed in both Swift v. Tyson, supra, and Erie was § 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, 1 Stat. 92 (amended by Rules of Decision Act § 1652, 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1964)). Swift v. Tyson, supra, had interpreted § 34 as merely requiring the federal
courts to follow state statutes, decisions construing those statutes, and decisions
as to "local" law, but leaving them free to make independent decisions as to matters
of "general" law. See Sharp & Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson Since 1900, 4 IND. L.J. 367, 370 (1929); Teton, The Story of Swift v. Tyson,
35 ILL. L. REv. 519 (1941). See generally HART & WEcnSLER, THm FEDERAL CoURTs AND
Ti FEDERAL.
SysrEM 610-21 (1953). This doctrine, although followed for nearly a
century, had become subject to ever-increasing criticism on several counts. First, the
natural law theory and its concomitant that the courts "find" rather than "make" law
was ridiculed by proponents of the emerging theory of judicial pragmatism. See,
e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting);

GRAY,

THE NATu.RE

AND

SOURCES

OF Tim LAw

241-59

(2d ed.

1927).

But see Green, The Law as Precedent, Prophecy, and Principle: State Decisions
in Federal Courts, 19 IL. L. RFv. 217 (1924). Second, the Swift doctrine had failed
to promote uniformity in the law. See 2 WARREN, THE SuPaREm COURT IN UNITED

STATES HISTORY 89 (rev. ed. 1935); Frankfurter, Distributionof JudicialPower Between
Federal and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 529 n.150 (1928). But cf. Yntema &
Jaffin, PreliminaryAnalysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction,79 U. PA. L. Rav. 869, 881 n.23
(1931). Third, Professor Charles Warren had uncovered evidence from which he concluded the intent of Congress in enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789 was that the
federal courts should apply both state statutory and state decisional law. See Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv.
49, 84-88 (1923). For criticisms of these conclusions see 2 CbossKEY, POLITICS AND TIlE
CONSnUTIoN IN TnE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 867 (1953); Jackson, "The Rise and
Fall of Swift v. Tyson;" 24 A.BA.J. 609, 614 (1958); Shulman, The Demise of Swift
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tinuing effort on the part of the Supreme Court to establish a workable line of demarcation between the two systems. Theoretically,
Erie and the federal rules represented correlative commands: in
diversity adjudications of state-created rights the federal courts shall
apply state substantive law3 and federal procedural law. 4 However, the inherent overlapping and interaction between "substance"
v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336, 1345 (1938). Finally, the Swift rule enabled a noncitizen to discriminate against the citizens of the forum state and to avoid the forum
state's laws. See Black & White Taxicab 9- Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518,532 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Dobie, Seven Implications
of Swift v. Tyson, 16 VA. L. REy. 225, 228 (1930); Fordham, The Federal Courts and
the Construction of Uniform State Laws, 7 N.C.L. Rav. 423, 430 (1929); Frankfurter, supra at 524-30; Shelton, ConcurrentJurisdiction-ItsNecessity and Its Dangers,
15 VA. L. Rav. 137 (1928). The intensity of the criticism of Swift v. Tyson, supra,precipitated the Court's abrupt overruling of it. See generally WRIGrr, FEDERAL COuLTS

§ 54 (1963).
'The federal rules were promulgated pursuant to authority granted by the
Federal Rules Act of 1934 (Enabling Act), 48 Stat. 1064 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964)).
Prior to 1938 federal court procedure had been governed by the Practice Conformity
Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. .197, which provided that federal procedure in cases
other than equity or admiralty should conform as near as may be to practice in
courts of the state wherein the federal court sat. As early as 1911, the American Bar
Association had called for the repeal of the Conformity Act and the adoption of a
uniform system of federal procedure. See Committee on Judicial Administration and
Remedial Procedure, Report, 37 A.B.A. RaP. 434, 435 (1912). See generally Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United States,
32 MICH. L. Rav. 1116 (1934). In 1938, shortly before its decision in Erie, the Court
promulgated the federal rules, which were subsequently approved by Congress. See
generally WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 62, at 222-25; Merrigan, Erie to York to
Ragan-A Triple Play on The FederalRules, 3 VAND L. REv. 711, 714-15 (1950).
a "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State ....
There is no federal
general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such power upon the federal courts." 304 U.S. at 78. Thus, unless
the right is one arising under one of the enumerated legislative powers of Congress,
Erie commanded that the substantive rights of litigants in diversity suits must be governed by state law. See Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-and of the New Federal Common
Law, 19 REcoR, oF N.Y.C.B.A. 64-79 (1964); Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 489, 509-10 (1954); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the
Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 541 (1958); Whiher, The Erie Doctrine and the
Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 549
(1959); cf. Herriott, Has Congress the Power to Modify the Effect of Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins?, 26 MARq. L. Rav. 1 (1941). Contra, 1 CRossaEY, PorricS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HIsroRy or THE UNrrED STATES 903-16 (1953); Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision-More on the Erie Case, 30 Ky. L.J. 3 (1941); Keefe, Gilhooley,
Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CoRNELL L.Q. 494, 497 (1949); Kurland, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE
LJ. 187, 188-204 (1957).
4 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). See Holtzoff, The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 24 J. Am. Jun. Soc'Y 57 (1940);
ef. Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417 (1941) (disagreeing
with Holtzoff's optimism as to the lack of conflict between Erie and the federal rules).

144

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1966:142

and "procedure" made the theoretical dichotomy difficult to maintain in practice. 5 This difficulty was compounded by the Court's
repeated failure to determine whether the foregoing dichotomy was
statutorily or constitutionally compelled. 6 In the recent case of
Hannav. Plumere the Supreme Court has attempted to eliminate this
confusion by refuting the correlation between the Erie doctrine
and the federal rules. Erie was deemed irrelevant to an assessment of
a conflict between federal rules and state requirements.8 Rather, the
rules are to be pre-eminent unless in their promulgation they have
exceeded the terms of their constitutional and statutory mandate. 9
In Hanna, an Ohio citizen had instituted a negligence action
in a Massachusetts federal district court against the executor of a
deceased Massachusetts citizen. Service of process was made on the
executor in accordance with federal rule 4 (d) (1)10 by leaving
copies of the summons and complaint at his residence with his wife.
However, a special Massachusetts statute dictated that either inhand service or notice filed in the proper registry of probate would
be requisite in a suit by a creditor of the deceased.11 The district
5

The advisory committee which drafted the rules recognized this inherent diffiPROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON THE FEDERAL RULES 182
(1938), and conceded that some of the rules might be invalidated as impinging upon
substantive law. Id. at 347.
The dividing line between "substance" and "procedure" is neither constant for all
purposes nor susceptible of precise definition. See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754
(Ist Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 651 (1940); 1 BARRON & HoLTzOFF, FEnERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 138, at 592-93 (1960); Tunks, Categorization and Federalism:
"Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271
(1939); Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 IND. I.
REv. 228, 231-32 (1964); Note, The Erie Doctrine and FederalRule 13(a), 46 MINN. L.
REv. 913, 926 (1962); cf. Morgan, The Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARv. L.
REV. 153 (1944). See generally 2 AUSTN, LECTURs ON JURISPRUDENCE 611 (4th ed.
1879); 1 CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MODERN LAw OF EVIDENCE §§ 168, 171 (1911); HOLLAND,

culty, ABA,

ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE

89 (l1th ed. 1910);

SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE

§ 172 (7th

ed. 1924); Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333
(1933); Curd, Substance and Procedure in Rule Making, 51 W. VA. L.J. 34 (1948);
Kocourek, Substance and Procedure, 10 FORDRaM L. Rxv. 172 (1941).
' See Hill, supra note 3, at 430; Whicher, supra note 3, at 550-53. See generally
WRIGHT,

op. cit. supra note 1, at § 56.

7380 U.S. 460 (1965).
8
Id. at 469-74.
* Id. at 471-72. See note 2, and authorities cited note 4 supra.
10 "The summons and complaint shall be served together. . . . Service shall be
made as follows:
"(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving
copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (1).
11
"Except as provided in this chapter, an executor or administrator shall not be
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court granted the executor's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Erie doctrine required that the state-prescribed method
govern the sufficiency of service. On appeal, the First Circuit concluded that the conflict posed between the state and federal rules involved "a substantive rather than a procedural matter," and
unanimously affirmed. 12 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the sufficiency of service was to be governed by rule 4 (d) (1) rather
than the conflicting state procedure. 13 Further, the "outcome" test
posited by post-Erie cases was deemed inappropriate to the resolu4
tion of such a conflict.'
The Hanna opinion encompasses a fundamental re-examination
and renovation of federal choice of law. This metamorphosis proceeded on three analytic planes. First, the constitutional status of
the federal rules, and indirectly, the Erie doctrine, was enunciated. 5
Further, the federal rules were freed from the fetters of the venerable
"outcome" test and were, in effect, elevated to the stature of "a
body of law inviolate."' 6 'Finally, in contexts other than conflicts
involving the federal rules, the Erie test for determining when
federal courts must apply state rather than federal substantive law
was substantially reformulated. 17
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF E UE

Perhaps the most perplexing and controversial aspect of the
Erie decision was Justice Brandeis' statement in the majority opinion
that "it was the unconstitutionality of the course pursued,"' 8 and
held to answer to an action by a creditor of the deceased . . . unless . . . the writ
in such action has been served by delivery in hand upon such executor or administrator or service thereof accepted by him or a notice stating the name of the
estate, the name and address of the creditor, the amount of the claim and the court
in which the action has been brought has been filed in the proper registry of probate ..
" MAss. ANN. L WS ch. 197, § 9 (1958).
12 331 F.2d 157, 159 (Ist Cir. 1964).
18 80 U.S. at 463-64.
26 Id. at 469-74.
1
51d. at 471-74.
1 Id. at 475-76 (Harlan, J., concurring). See id. at 471-72.
17
Id. at 466-69.
18 304 U.S. at 77-79. Brandeis summarized the new rule by asserting that "whether
the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they
commercial law or part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports
to confer such a power upon the federal courts." Id. at 78. From these general principles Brandeis concluded: "In disapproving that doctrine [Swift v. Tyson] we do
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not merely a reinterpretation of the Rules of Decisions Act, 10 that
compelled the overruling of Swift v. Tyson.20 The Rules of Decisions Act, said the Court, required federal courts to apply state
statutory and decisional law when adjudicating state-created rights
in diversity cases. The question posed but inadequately answered
by Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement was whether the requirements of
the act marked the limits of congressional authority to confer judicial
power upon the federal courts, or whether the statute merely restricted the otherwise permissible scope of federal court power to
formulate "substantive rules of common law applicable in a State." 21
The assertion in the Erie opinion that "there is no federal general common law"2 2 in diversity cases has been interpreted by
some to imply that deference to state decisional law is constitutionally binding on Congress and the federal courts in matters outside
the scope of the constitutional grants of legislative power to the
federal government. 23 However, Brandeis' failure to enunciate fully
the nature or extent of this ostensible constitutional restriction
prompted the majority of commentators to dismiss the brief references to it as "unfortunate dicta."2 4 Rather, the argument advanced by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reed in Erie2 5 was
not hold unconstitutional § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other act
of Congress. We merely declare that in applying the doctrine this Court and
the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Con.
stitution to the several States." Id. at 79-80. See generally WuGrr, op. cit. supra note

1, §§ 55-56.

29 The Rules of Decision Act provided that "the laws of the several states, except
where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts
of the United States in cases where they apply." Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92
(now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964)).
20 14 U.S. (16 Pet.) 166 (1842). See note I supra.
2' 304 U.S. at 78. See generally 'Wmor, op. cit. supra note 1, § 55, at 191-93, § 56.
22 304 U.S. at 78.
5
2 Friendly, supra note "3; Hart supra note 3; see Hill, supra note 3; Whicher, supra

note 3.
2' This opinion was expressed in 1941 by Mr. Justice Stone in a letter to Mr. Justice
Roberts. See MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: P.mLAR OF Ts

LAw 481 n.t (1956).

For the view that Erie was not constitutionally compelled see Ahrens, Erie v.
Tompkins-The Not So Common Law, 1 WAsHBurN L.J. 343 (1961); Cowan, Constitutional Aspects of the Abolition of Federal"Common Law," 1 LA. L. RaV. 161, 171
(1938); McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts,
33 ILL. L. REv. 126, 135 (1938); authorities cited as "contra" note 3 supra. However,
this view was not unanimously shared. See Bowman, The Unconstitutionality of the
of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson, 18 B.U.L. REv. 659 (1938); authorities cited note
23 supra.
s504 U,S, at 90-9g.
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accorded the most currency by analysts. 20 Reed had urged that
the grant of judicial power under article III might, when coupled
with the necessary and proper clause, give the federal courts and
Congress the power to establish substantive rules of decision for
cases cognizable in federal courts.2 7 This expansive view of article
III would thus enable the federal government to exercise its power
over "non-federal" matters litigated in the federal courts. 28

Rejection of the thesis that Erie had no constitutional ramificacations was short-lived, however. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.2 9
re-opened the question by implying that if a federal statute at issue
in that case had purported to govern the substantive rights of litigants in diversity suits it might have been unconstitutional.0 However, while Bernhardt convinced many critics that the Supreme
Court had in fact intended to place Erie on a constitutional foundation, the continuing lack of judicial exposition of the issue perpetuated the confusion and controversy.'
2a See W~iGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 56, at 195-96, 197 n.13. See generally authorities cited as "contra" note 3 supra.
27 304 U.S. at 92. Thus, under Mr. Justice Reed's expansive interpretation of article
III, as under the Brandeis rationale, the federal government was denied the authority
to enact general legislation over matters subject to exclusive state jurisdiction.
28The Erie decision has been interpreted as leaving within federal rule-making
power questions of federal interest. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957), citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 368,
366-67 (1943); Friendly, supra note 3, at 79-92; 1965 DuKE L.J. 828. However, the Reed
thesis is more comprehensive in scope than the Clearfield doctrine. Under the former
interpretation the federal government could establish rules of decision in prohibited
non-federal interest areas insofar as the issues are litigated in the federal courts. For
example, Congress could establish rules to govern tort claims so long as the rules
thus promulgated applied only to suits in the federal courts.
8350 U.S. 198 (1956), 45 CALw. L. Rnv. 87 (1957), The Supreme Court, 1956 Term,
70 HA',v. L. Ryv. 83, 137 (1957).
"The Bernhardt case involved a contract containing an arbitration clause for
resolution of disputes arising from the agreement. Action was begun on the contract
in a federal district court sitting in Vermont, and the defendant moved for a stay
pending arbitration. Vermont law did not consider such clauses binding, while § 3 of
the United States Arbitration Act, 9 US.C. §§ 1-3 (1964), if applicable, did. The
Court reasoned that "if ...
[defendant's] contention is correct, a constitutional question might be presented. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins indicated that Congress does not
have the constitutional authority to make the law that is applicable to controversies
in diversity of citizenship cases. . . . We therefore read § 3 narrowly to avoid that
issue." 350 U.S. at 202. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, added that "in view of the
ground that was taken in...
[the Erie case] for its decision, it would raise a serious
question of constitutional law whether Congress could subject to arbitration litigation
in the federal courts which is there solely because it is between 'Citizens of different
States ....
I" id. at 208.
"I See Hill, supra note 3, at 607-09; Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's Eye
View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. Rv. 443, 465-70 (1962);
Whiher, supra note 3, at 550-54. See generally WRiGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, § 56,
at 196-98.
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In the meantime, the scope of Erie had been eroded by the expanding field of "federal common law" in areas deemed to involve
a "dominant federal interest. '3 2 In matters "essentially of [a]
federal character ' 33 which have been found to necessitate a uniform
national rule,3 4 such as federal fiscal concerns, 35 interstate waterways,36 patent and copyright law3 7 and federal statutes in general,38 federal decisional law has bourgeoned. The most pervasive
32See 1 BARRON & HOLTzOFF, op. cit. supra note 5, § 8, at 36-37; WPIGHT, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 60, at 213-18; Friendly, supra note 3, at 79-92; Hill, State Procedural
Law in Federal Non-Diversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. REV. 66, 98-105 (1955); Comment, 69 YAL L.J. 1441 (1960); Note, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 991 (1953).
83 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). The Court noted
that Erie was not designed as a wedge for "broadening state power over matters essentially of federal character or for determining whether issues are of that nature." Id.
at 307.
8, See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943), 43 CoLuMt. L.
REv. 520, 18 IND. L.J. 311, 18 TUL. L. REv. 152. "The application of state law ...
would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty.
It would lead to great diversity in results by making identical transactions subject
to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule
is plain." Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra at 367. For criticism of the
Court's reasoning in Clearfield see Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 797, 828-32 (1957); Note, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 991, 1005-08 (1953).
"See National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945)
(forged government check); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 34
(same); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1942) (action by
FDIC on note transferred by state bank as collateral); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S.
190, 200-01 (1940) (suit on a note against director of a national bank). See Friendly,
supra note 3, at 82-85. "The Clearfield doctrine has spread into many other types of
litigation over obligations by or to the United States." Id. at 83.
a$ See Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938). Cf. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The rationale for the application of federal law to controversies over interstate waterways is an aspect of the
more general rule as to the application of federal law to govern controversies between
states. See generally West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931); Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163,
176-77 (1930); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95-98 (1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185
U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902); 21 HARV. L. Rzv. 132 (1907).
"7 See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 US. 173, 175-76 (1942). See also
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 US. 570, 580-81 (1956); T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d
823, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dictum), 1965 DuXE L.J. 828. As to the application of federal law to unfair competition in or affecting interstate commerce see,
e.g., Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1958)
(registered trademarks); L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649,

650-51 (3d Cir. 1954) (false representation of goods in commerce); Stauffer v. Exley,
184 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1950) (general national law of unfair competition exists
under federal trademark laws). See generally Bunn, The National Law of Unfair
Competition, 62 HAav. L. REv. 987 (1949); Friendly, supra note 3, at 86-88; Note,
Developments in the Law-Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARv. L. REv. 814

(1955).
38 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957) (NLRA);
Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 320 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1944) (ICC approval
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expansion of the scope of "federal interest" was instituted in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.39 That case involved a non-statutory rule, the act of state doctrine, which the Court deemed a
matter of "intrinsically federal" common law binding upon state
and federal courts alike. 40 The underpinnings of that decision
are uncertain however, and the Court's lack of specificity in articulating the constitutional foundation of an "intrinsically federal"
categorization poses several possible interpretations of permissible
judicial power in the area of "federal interest." Under a broad
but tenable reading of Sabbatino, the scope of matters classifiable
as "intrinsically federal" has been vastly expanded to encompass
all affirmative grants of constitutional power to any branch of the
federal government. 41 At the very least, by deeming foreign relaof bills of lading gives the bills the force of federal law); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (§ 10 (b) of the Security Exchange Act and rule X-10b-5
of the SEC); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (§ 15 of the
Investment Company Act). See geherally 1 Loss, SEcuRms REGULATION 102-05 (1961);
Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARV. L. Rxv. 1 (1957); Mishkin, supra note 34, at 814-20; Comment, 28
U. CHI. L. REv. 707 (1961); Note, 27 IND. LJ. 231 (1952).
8-376 U.S. 398 (1964).
40Id. at 427-28. "Whatever considerations are thought to predominate, it is
plain that the problems involved are uniquely federal in nature. If federal authority,
in this instance this Court, orders the field of judicial competence in this area for
the federal courts, and the state courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the
purposes behind the doctrine could be effectively undermined as if there had been
no federal pronouncement on the subject .... We are not without other precedent
for a determination that federal law governs ....

Principles formulated by federal

judicial law have been thought by this Court to be necessary to protect uniquely
federal interests." Id. at 426. See Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353
F.2d 47 (1965).
42See Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64
CoLum. L. REv. 805, 818 (1964). Contra, Friendly, supra note 3, at 82; Mishkin, supra
note 34, at 800 n.13. "Even dearly established legislative power would not automatically
imply law-making competence in the federal courts." Ibid.
"The Court seems determined to assert that the power of the courts to make law
-as in Sabbatino-is not derivative, or auxiliary to that of the political branches, but
is an independent power of the federal judiciary under the Constitution. The Court
does not insist that Act of State or foreign relations are special; it does not strive
to avoid the impression that the independent power of the federal courts to make
supreme federal law might reach anywhere in the federal domain." Henkin, supra
at 806. Thus, under this expansive reading of Sabbatino the power of the federal courts
to apply federal law is limited to matters within the broad panoply of powers granted
to Congress and the executive, see notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text, but within
that "federal domain" the courts are constitutionally empowered to develop federal
common law independent of congressional direction. This rationale seemingly
negates the interpretation of article III, such as that advanced by Professor BrohKahn, which viewed the grant of "judicial power" to the federal courts as an independent source of federal rule-making power, enabling the federal judiciary
to apply decisional law to factual contexts which could not be reached under articles
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tions an "intrinsically federal" area necessitating a uniform body of
law, Sabbatino has demonstrated the increasing propensity of the
federal common law to encroach on areas which have previously been
viewed as arguably subject to state law.
Within this context of expanding judicial power over "intrinsically federal" matters, the Hanna decision has now begun a
pincers movement upon the Erie reservation of state law-making
power. One flank of the pincer is comprised of the expanding federal
interest concept. The Hanna opinion in no way arrested this expansion, and its tenor arguably accorded it an added impetus by lending credence to the broader view of Sabbatino.42 Further, Hanna
I and II.Professor Broh-Kahn, in what is perhaps the most comprehensive article
advocating the foregoing "expansive view" of article III, argued that "it is not, therefore, by virtue of a power expressly delegated to Congress that federal courts exercise
full judicial power and complete independence in causes to which their jurisdiction
attaches. It is solely by virtue of the grant of judicial power in the Judiciary Article.
This is as much an express delegation of complete power to the federal courts as the
bankruptcy, commerce or any other power is expressly delegated to Congress." BrohKahn, supra note 3, at 27. See generally CROSSKEY, supra note 3, at 563-77, 711-937.
See also Dodd, The Decreasing Importance of State Lines, 27 A.B.A.J. 78, 83 (1941).
While such a broad interpretation of Sabbatino has not been rejected, narrower
interpretations are undoubtedly possible. It might be argued that the rationale of
Sabbatino is rooted in the notion that the conduct of foreign relations inheres in
the sovereignty of the federal government. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936) (Sutherland, J.). However, such an interpretation
fails to illustrate "why the intrinsically federal character of foreign relations . . .
provides need or warrant for inferring an unusual, independent law-making power
in the courts." Henkin, supra at 818-19 & n.45. Seemingly, a more plausible alternative interpretation is rendered by Henkin's notation that act of state is possibly a
peculiarly judicial doctrine relating to conflicts of law and thus resolvable by the
courts themselves. Given this plethora of possible rationales, Henkin concluded that
perhaps the need for uniformity and federal supremacy in the field of foreign affairs
weighed against the relatively minor state interest involved in questions concerning
an act of state makes this area "intrinsically federal" and dictates that the courts
need not "wait on the political branches and ... [may] make law that should also
bind the states and state courts." Id. at 819. Some support for this view was provided by a dictum of Judge Friendly in Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank,
supra note 40. Friendly read Sabbatino as asserting that "all questions relating
to an act of state are questions of federal law, to be determined ultimately, if need be,
by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. at 51. "This law-making power in the
federal courts derives by necessary inference from the Constitution itself." Id. at 51 n.2.
'The Court stated in Hanna that "neither Congress nor the federal courts can,
under the 'guise of formulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules
which are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or
some other section of the Constitution ......
380 U.S. at 471. By equating judicial
power with that accorded to other branches by other sections of the Constitution,
this statement is consistent with the broadest interpretation of Sabbatino-that federal rule-making authority encompasses all affirmative grants of power to any
branch of the federal government. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court viewed federal power to prescribe procedural rules for the federal
courts as permitting "'uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local
rules. This is especially true of matters which relate to the administration of legal
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commenced a flanking movement on another of Erie's perimeters.
The Court unambiguously asserted that Congress is empowered under article III, as augmented by the necessary and proper clause, to
enact a rule which is rationally classified as procedural, even though
that rule may affect state-created rights when said rights are adjudicated in diversity suits. 48
The Court has in essence defined the federal rules as comprising an "intrinsically federal" area, thus elevating them to a
preeminent position vis-a-vis state law. Therefore, coupling the
Hanna decision with the broader interpretation of Sabbatino, the
reach of federal interest has been so expanded that little scope is
reserved to exclusively state law-making authority. 44 The only apparent restriction upon this expansion which has been consistently
articulated is that of the vague and relatively ineffectual limitation
of the necessary and proper clause.45 Thus, these pincer-like enproceedings, an area in which federal courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the
Rules .... ' [quoting from Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764
(5th Cir. 1963).] 380 US. at 472-73. (Emphasis added.) The Court thus appears to
categorize federal procedure as an "intrinsically federal" matter to which federal law
may be applied, thereby making the application of the federal rules in diversity suits
merely another aspect of the "federal interest" concept. Given this interpretation
of the quoted language in Hanna, a "federal interest" impliedly can arise not only in
connection with the provisions of articles I and II, but may also emanate from the
judicial powers conferred by article III.
,1 Id. at 472-73. See also note 88 snfra and accompanying text.
"The expanse of "federal interest" appears broad enough to provide Congress
and, perhaps, the federal courts, with a constitutional imprimatur should they choose
to accord the federal courts power to make independent choice of law decisions in
diversity cases. Such a course would entail the reversal of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), a progeny of Erie which presumably shares the same constitutional mantle. The requisite federal interest in federal choice-of-law rules is
arguably inherent in the role of the federal judiciary as an intermediary in conflicts
between the divergent interests of different states. As Professor Cavers noted in discussing the advisability of vitiating Klaxon, "In the independent federal judiciary we
appear to have umpires made to our hand. If they cannot work out a system for the
accommodation of conflicting state laws, how can one reasonably expect the state
courts to do so?" CAvns, TmE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 217 (1965). See ALI STUDY OF
THE DrvisxoN OF JURIsDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTs 35, 98 (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1963), Leflar, ConstitutionalLimits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PRoB. 706 (1963). See also Cavers, The Changing Choice of Law Process and the
Federal Courts, 28 LAw & CoNTan'. PROB. 732 (1963).
,5In Hanna the Court stated that "the constitutional provision for a federal court
system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in
turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain
area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as
either." 380 US. at 472. Thus, the validity of an enactment challenged as a "substantive" encroachment upon state prerogative is ostensibly to be measured by the
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croachments on their face appear to afford almost unlimited scope
to the development and application of federal common law.
Some curtailment of this expansion may be implied from the
language of Hanna, however. In discussing the dictates of the "outcome" test, the Court determined that the crux of the Erie rationale
was the avoidance of forum-shopping and "inequitable administration of the law," both of which result in unfair discrimination
against forum-state litigants. 4 The Court viewed such "unfairness"
as characteristic of the "sort of equal protection problems which
troubled the Court in Erie."4 7 The allusion to equal protection is
ostensibly imprecise because the fourteenth amendment is literally
limited in its applicability to states and state courts. 48 However,
strictures of the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CoNSr. art. I, § 8 (18). Under such a
test, Congress would be accorded complete discretion as to the effectuation of its
constitutional powers, subject only to the caveat that there must be a rational nexus
between the constitutional power being implemented and the means employed. See
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316, 413-21 (1819).
Such .a holding constitutes a substantial reallocation of power both between Congress and the courts and between the state and federal governments. Although it was
precisely the possibility of dual classification as substance or procedure that necessitated the Court's post-Erie attempts to determine the proper differentiation between
the two categories, in Hanna the Court has relinquished this decision to Congress insofar as the federal rules are concerned. While the Court reaffirmed the constitutional prohibition against substantive federal law-making in "non-federalinterest" areas, 380 U.S. at 471-72, the Hanna decision necessarily implied that if a
rule is "rationally capable of classification" as procedure, this classification is not
a constitutional but merely a policy question subject to congressional alteration. The
"rationally procedure" test in itself provides Congress with wide rule-making discretion. This latitude is augmented by the fact that the courts have traditionally
given great deference to congressional exercises of power under the necessary and
proper clause. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 183 (1954); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 757-65 (1948);
Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 440-41 (1884).
Given such a broad delegation of power, the scope of federal common law could
be expanded to embrace matters such as the parol evidence rule, which is arguably
procedural but has a significant effect upon a litigant's substantive rights. Moreover,
by finding federal power to legislate within the vagaries of substance and procedure,
Hanna vested Congress with greater power than it had claimed in the Enabling Act,
which disclaimed the right to promulgate "substantive rules."
48380 U.S. at 467-69. See generally text accompanying notes 82-94 infra.
'380 U.S. at 468. (Emphsis added.) Variations of this phrase recur throughout the
opinion. "'Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.' Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins .... " Id. at 467. "Moreover, it is difficult to argue that ... [a difference between Massachusetts and federal service requirements] alters the mode of enforcement of state-created rights in a fashion sufficiently 'substantial' to raise the sort of
equal protection problems to which the Erie opinion alluded." Id. at 469. See Woods
v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496 (1941).
48 "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally, THz CONsTITUTION OF THE
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there is a latent body of authority which would infer the rudiments
of equal protection into the "fairness" requirements of the fifth
amendment's due process clause.'
Under this rationale, the
requisites of equal protection might thereby be incorporated into
the general rubrics of either substantive or procedural due process.5 0
Whether or not pristine "equal protection" may be so inferred,
UNITFD STATES OF AmEiCA: ANALYSIS AND INEPRETATION 1082-1214, 1279-1321 (Small
ed. 1963). However, the fifth amendment does not contain an "equal protection"
clause. See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337-38 (1943); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1939).
19 "The Fifth Amendment... does not contain an equal protection clause as does
the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness,
are not mutually exclusive. The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See Detroit Bank v. United States, supra
note 43 (dictum); Currin v. Wallace, supra note 43, at 13-14 (dictum); Steward
Machine Co. v., Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) (dictum). Moreover, "relying upon
public policy and its supervisory authority over federal courts, the Supreme Court
has reached results similar to those arrived at under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment ....
" Tim CONSrirrtoN OF THE UNrED STATES OF
AMERCA: ANALYSIS AND INTERMETATION

974 (Small ed. 1963). See Hurd v. Hodge,

334 U.S. 24, 34-36 (1948); Petrillo v. United States, 332 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947); Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192,
198-200, 208-09 (1944); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943); Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAxI. L. REv. 341, 361-65 (1949).
5 In Boiling v. Sharpe, supra note 49, the issue was racial discrimination in
District of Columbia public schools. While the issue was thus solely the inclusion
of the guarantees of "equal protection" within the prohibitions of "substantive
due process," the "equal protection-due process" interaction is not confined to this
sphere. The "fairness" conduit by which equal protection was absorbed by the due
process clause in Boiling also underlies the proscriptions of "procedural due process."
See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-26, 328 (1937). Thus, the Bolling rationale
would equally support the incorporation of the fourteenth amendment's "equal
protection" requirements into that "procedural due process" guaranteed by the
fifth.
"Fairness" in an "equal protection" sense has also been read into the "procedural due
process" clause of the fourteenth amendment. See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). It has been argued that this technique was applied by the Supreme Court in
Griffin v. Illinois, -351 U.S. 12 (1956), involving a denial of counsel on appeal. "Discrimination is a part of denial of due process, just as it is a part of denial of equal
protection. Denial to all equally of a privilege which due process does not in absolute
terms exact, may come to violate due process if the denial is arbitrarily applied to
some persons but not to others. And yet arbitrary discrimination is the traditional
way of violating the equal protection clause. Thus, the two concepts overlap." Wllcox
and Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL
L.Q. 11, 22 (1957). See the discussions in Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 255 (D.C. Cir.
1963); The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARV. L. REv. 54, 172 (1962). Moreover,
the non-discrimination prohibitions of "equal protection" may in one case have been
transported into the "procedural due process" requirements of the fifth amendment.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1962) (dictum).
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the Hanna Court's concern for the preservation of a basic standard
of fairness suggests the conclusion that a due process standard has
been enunciated. 1 Such an interpretation of Erie would comport
with "the traditional notions of fair play and effective justice" imposed by procedural due process in analogous areas such as jurisdiction,5 2 providing a test with established standards and prag51 The Hanna Court views the concept of "fundamental fairness" as the underlying policy of the Erie decision. "The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization
that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ
because the suit had been brought in a federal court." 380 U.S. at 467. The Court
subsequently observed that "the importance of a state rule is indeed relevant, but
only in the context of asking whether application of the rule would make so important a difference to the character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce
it would unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State ... ." Id. at 468 n.9.
See also discussion in note 41 supra. Thus, whether the Court's references to "equal
protection," see note 47 supra and accompanying text, are interpreted as incorporating
the strictures of the equal protection clause (thereby implying a utilization of
Boiling v. Sharpe rationale) or merely a capsulization of the general concept of
"fundamental fairness," the Court's adoption of a due process standard seems clear.
But see McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. Ry.
884, 890 (1965).
Moreover, the Court's treatment of the federal rules, see text accompanying notes 75-81
infra, adds credence to the foregoing interpretation of "fairness" to individual litigants
as the limitation upon the expansion of federal interest. The imposition of a
"rationality" limitation on federal procedural rule-making authority comports with
the standard by which legislation is measured under an "equal protection-due process"
analysis. See Tussman & tenBroeck, supra note 49, at 334-56. Thus, the Court, in
the concluding paragraph of its opinion, 380 U.S. at 473, indicates that a congressional "command" to apply the federal rules in all cases cognizable by the federal
courts is not, nor could it constitutionally be, absolute. Rather, while deference
is to be accorded congressional determinations of whether a rule is procedural, If
the effect of such a rule would be to permit an out-of-state litigant to "unfairly
discriminate" against the forum-state litigant, the application of the federal rule
would be unconstitutional as a denial of due process. Cf. note 81 infra.
52 In outlining the permissible scope of state court jurisdiction the Supreme Court
has asserted that "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum,
he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' Milliken v.
Meyer, 811 U.S. 457, 463.. .. See Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 245 U.S. 90,
91 .....
"
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 826 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 389 U.S. 806, 814-16 (1950). The International
Shoe due process standard has been applied to the federal courts with respect
to service of process upon foreign corporations. See Woodworkers Tool Works v.
Byrne, 191 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1951) (federal courts are required by the fifth
amendment to apply the International Shoe standard). See also Lone Star Package
Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954); Consolidated Cosmetics
v. D-A Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1951); Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach.
Co., 167 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1948); Scott v. Middle East Airlines Co., 240 F. Supp.
1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 778, 782
(E.D. Pa. 1961); Note, 69 Htv. L. REv. 508, 514-15 .(1956). But see Green, Federal
Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporation and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. Rav. 967
(1961).
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matic flexibility. 3 If this interpretation is tenable, the outlines of
the limitation imposed on the encroachment of federal common law
on state prerogatives emerge into clearer focus: federal common
law may not infringe upon state law-making power in such a way
as to vitiate the fairness requirement of due process.
THE

"OUTCOME"

TEST DISTINGUISHED

Aside from the controversy emanating from the constitutional
references in Erie, the federal courts in the post-1938 era became
preoccupied with the collateral pragmatic problem of constructing
a workable test for determining when Erie required the application
of state law. The potential conflict between state law and a body of
nationally uniform federal rules of procedure was a major source
of friction. Hanna, by emancipating the federal rules from the
strictures of the Erie doctrine, has authoritatively resolved the controversy by elevating the rules to prominence within their "procedural" sphere.
At the inception of the Erie test, it was assumed that if the
doctrine was to work in harmony with the federal rules the Court
would utilize the traditional substance-procedure dichotomy. 54 However, the lack of adequate analytic guidelines to determine what was
procedure rather than substance within the Erie context almost immediately led to inconsistency and confusion among the federal
courts, commentators and the bar. 55 In attempting to provide these
guidelines, the Supreme Court quickly indicated that it did not
intend to be bound by customary substance-procedure categorizations.56 This trend away from mechanical classification had cul113A requirement that federal law be subservient where a conflict between the
federal and state law results in "invidious" or "unfair" discrimination would both
prevent a reversion to a mechanistic search for uniformity in outcome and allow a
greater scope for the application of federal law, while preventing the federal
government from substantially undermining state legislative prerogatives.
"Holtzoff, supra note 4, at 57; Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play
on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. Rxv. 711 (1950); Note, 39 GEo. L.J. 600, 601 (1951);
29 GEo. LJ. 923, 924-25 (1941). See Clark, supra note 4, at 418-19; Driver, The Federal
Civil Rules in Diversity Cases, 30 ORE. L. Rav. 69-73 (1950).
The assumption that concepts of substance and procedure would be focal to an
Erie analysis of the federal rules also received some judicial support in the early
cases. E.g., HFG Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 162 F.2d 536, 539-40 (7th Cir. 1947);
Perrott v. United States Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953, 955-56 (D. Del. 1944).
0.317 (8), at 3540-41; Keefe, Gilhooley, Bailey
,',See IA MooRE, FE:DERAL PRACTcE
& Day, Weary Erie, 34 CoRNuaL L.Q. 494, 508 (1949); Weintraub, supra note 5, at
232-35; Note, 46 MINN. L. Rv. 913, 926 (1962).
11See Merrigan, supra note 54, at 711; Weintraub, The Erie Doctrineand State Conflict of Laws Rules, 39 IND. L: REv. 228, 231-33 (1964).
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minated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York," which held that preErie labels were immaterial. For Erie purposes a rule of law was
deemed "substantive" if application of the federal, rather than the
state rule, would significantly affect the result of the litigation."8
Further, the Guaranty court structured this "outcome" test to require that in adjudicating state-created rights in diversity suits, a
federal court shall act as "only another court of the State." 59 Therefore, the federal courts could not afford a remedy if the state's courts
would have refused it, nor could the federal courts "substantially
affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State."10
In applying the Guaranty test, deference was accorded to state
law "in matters which, for other purposes, are clearly procedural."0 1
In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,P2 for example, the Supreme Court held that in a diversity action adjudicating a stockholder's derivative suit, the federal courts must apply a New Jersey
826 U.S. 99 (1945), 44 MIcH. L. REv. 477 (1945), 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 145 (1946),
31 VA. L. REv. 948 (1945).
58326 U.S. at 106. See generally Driver, supra note 54, at 71-72; Weintraub, supra
57

note 56, at 233-34; Note, 39 GEo. L.J. 600, 602 (1951); Note, 46 MINN. L. REv. 913 (1962).
Guaranty thus adopted a test previously proposed by Judge Magruder in Sampson

v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756-58 (Ist Cir. 1940), by Professors Tunks, Categorization
and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,
84 ILL. L. REv. 271, 278 (1939), and Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58
HtAv. L Rev. 153, 175-76 (1944). See Note, 39 GEo. LJ.600 (1951).
326 U.S. at 108.
$Old.at 108-09.
1
* WRIGHT, FEmERAL CouaTs § 58, at 208 (1963).
S337 U.S. 541 (1949), 35 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950), 48 MICH. L. REv. 706 (1950),
35 VA. L.REv. 789 (1949). For earlier application and development of the "outcome"
test see, e.g., Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Hills v. Price, 79 F. Supp. 494
(E.D.S.C. 1948).
Two other cases decided the same year as Cohen indicate the breadth of the
deference to be accorded state law in diversity actions. In Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer. &. Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), 35 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950), 38
GEO. L.J. 115 (1949), 48 MICH. L. Rev. 531 (1950), service of process was required by
state law in order to toll the state's statute of limitations. Contra, 337 U.S. at 557-61
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Despite the fact that the mere filing of a complaint in accordance with rule 3 was sufficient to commence a suit in a federal court, the
court held that the additional state law requirement must be met to toll the statute.
Woods v. Interstate Realty CO., 337 U.S.- 535 (1949), 35 CORNELL L.Q. 420 (1950), 44
ILL. L.ReV. 533 (1949); 24 IN. L. REv. 418 (1949), 28 TEXAS L. REv. 444 (1950), held
that a state statute which barred foreign corporations not qualified to do business
in the state from suing in the state courts also operated to bar said corporation from
suing in the federal courts sitting in that state. Contra, 387 U.S. at 338-40 (Jackson,
Rutledge and Burton, JJ. dissenting). See generally WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 61, §
59, at 208-09; Driver, supra note 54, at 74-76; Weintraub, supra note 56, at 288-34;
Note, 18 GEo. WASH. L.REv. 240 (1950); Note, 66 HAiv. L. RLev. 1516, 1517 n.5 (1953);
46 MINN. L. REv. 913, 928 n.80 (1962); 39 TEXAS L. REv. 680, 683 n.30 (1961).
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statute63 requiring the posting of security for payment of expenses
as a condition of prosecuting the action, although federal rule
23 (b) 64 does not require such security. Thus, despite language to
the contrary in Hanna,5 the Supreme Court has applied an Erie
test to cases posing an ostensible conflict between state law and the
federal rules. Under the aegis of the "outcome" test, the rules were
restrictively construed or subordinated throughout the federal court
system. 66 This modified Erie test, therefore, appeared to have vitiated
the goal of a uniform procedure in the federal courts.
03 N.J. Laws ch. 131, § 1,at 487-88 (1945).
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b).
65"The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true that
there have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state rule in the face
of an argument that the situation was governed by one of the Federal Rules. But
the holding of each such case was not that Erie commanded displacement of a Federal
Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was
not as broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule
which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law."

880 U.S. at 470.
"[T]his Court has never before been confronted with a case where the applicable
Federal Rule is in direct collision with the law of the relevant State ...." Id. at 472.
61See Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Fox, 102 F. Supp. 214, 222 (N.D. Iowa 1952); IA MooRE,

FRAncEic
0.317(8), - at 354041 (2d ed. 1953). Illustrative of this conflict
is the lower courts' treatment of sufficiency of evidence (rules 38, 39, 50). Compare.
Pogue v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1957), and Ryan v.
Adam Scheidt Brewing Co., 197 F.2d 614, 615 (3d Cir. 1952), with Lovas v. General
Motors Corp., 212 F.2d 805, 807 (6th Cir. 1954), and O'Donnell v. Geneva Metal
Wheel Co., 190 F.2d 59, 60 (6th Cir. 1950). A similar conflict in regard to direction
of verdicts (rule 50) has also been posed. Compare Lowry v. Seaboard Airline R.R.,
171 F-.2d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 1948) and Guthrie v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 151 F.2d 738,
740 (4th Cir. 1945), with Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Henry, 235 F.2d 770, 772-73 (6th Cir.
1956), and Elder v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 200, 202 (8th Cir. 1946).
For more extensive examinations of particular areas of conflict see Hill, The Erie
Doctrineand the Constitution,53 Nw. U.L. Rav. 427, 432-37 (1958); Weintraub, supra
note 56, at 234-35; Note, 39 GEo. L.J. 600, 604-05 (1951).
The interpretations given the "outcome" test by three 1949 decisions, Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949);
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (see note
51 supra and accompanying text), prompted the draftsman of the rule to comment
that "hardly one of the heralded Federal Rules can be considered safe from attack."
Clark, Book Review, 36 Com.L L.Q. 181, 183 (1950). See generally Clark, Federal
FEDERAL

ProceduralReform and States Rights: To a More Perfect Union, 40 TEXAs L. Rv.

211, 220 (1961); Driver, supra note 48, at 76-77; Gavit, State's Rights and Federal
Prodedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1 (1950); Hart, The Relation Between State and FederalLaw,

54 COLuM. L. REv. 489, 512-15 (1954); Merrigan, supra note 54, at 717; Smith, Blue
Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TU_..
L. REv. 443, 447 (1962); Note, 39 Gao. LJ.600, 602-06 (1951); Note, 39 TExAs L. Rzv.
680, 6883 (1961).

Numerous authorities called for the limitation of the Erie test so as to preserve
the federal rules. See, e.g., Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Runs Riot-Extensions of the Erie
Case, 31 Ky. L.J. 99, 119-21 (1943); Farinholt, Angel v. Bullington: Twilight of Diversity Jurisdiction?, 26 N.C.L. Rav. 29, 49-50 (1947); Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in
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Upon a thirteen-year foundation of experience under the "outcome" test, the Court introduced the concept of "affirmative countervailing considerations" in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Co-op.67 Byrd announced that the "outcome" test was not the sole
criterion; "affirmative countervailing considerations" may dictate
disregard of state practice regardless of "outcome.""" The Byrd
case involved a conflict between state and federal practice in regard
to the nature of questions requiring jury determination. 9 While
noting that a difference in outcome would not likely be caused by
application of the federal rather than the state procedure, 70 the
Supreme Court asserted that the courts were also to examine the
policies behind the competing rules to determine if the state's
policy was of sufficient importance to outweigh that underlying the
federal rule.71 The Court found a strong policy favoring exclusive
federal control of the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts
and held that the federal requirement should govern. 72 However,
the Byrd opinion was replete with qualifications, 73 and this weakRetrospect: An Analysis of Its Proper Area and Limits, 35 A.BAJ. 19, 86 (1949);
Wolkin, Conflict of Laws in the Federal Courts: The Erie Era, 94 U. PA. L. Rav. 293,
307 (1946); Note, 18 GEo.WASH. L. REv. 240, 250-51 (1950); 33 VA. L. Rav. 739, 748-49
(1947). However, some commentators maintained that nearly all of the rules could
be applied under the "outcome" test. See, e.g., Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And of the
New Federal Common Law, 19 RPcoaD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 78-79 (1964); Federal Trials
and the Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 338, 342-43 (1959); Note, 62 HARe. L. REv.
1030, 1040.41 (1949); Note, 66 HARv. L. Ray. 1516, 1518-25 (1953).
07 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958), 44 A.BA.J. 975 (1958), 72 HxAv. L. Rv.i47 (1958), 43
MXNN. L. Rzv. 580 (1959), 28 U. CINc. L. Rv.390 (1959).
68 356 U.S. at 537-38.
49
As a defense to a diversity action to recover for personal injury allegedly due to
negligence, the defendant asserted that plaintiff was its employee for purposes of the
South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, and that said act provided plaintiff
an exclusive remedy. Under South Carolina law this defense must be determined
by the judge rather than the jury, while under federal law plaintiff was entitled to
have
70 the issue decided by the jury. Id. at 528-31.
1d. at 539.40.
71
Id. at 537-38.
72 Id. at 538-39.
73 The Court in its opinion did not purport to be dispensing with the "outcome"
test and any impetus for reform the decision may have had was weakened because of
(1) the importance of the seventh amendment's guaranty of trial by jury to the decision; and (2) the Court's assertion that the "outcome" test would not have required
the application of state law in any event. See Smith, supra note 66, at 449-70; Weintraub, supra note 56, at 235-37; Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 TExAs L. REv. 549, 554-63 (1959).
But cf. 1 BARRON & HOL-ZOFF, FEDEPAL PRAL-rICE AND PROCEDURE § 138, at 596; Degan,
The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal Courts, 24 F.RMD. 341, 352 n.36a
(1959). But see Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. Rv.
1082, 1098-99 (1963); Storke, Conflicts Erie Cases, 32 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 20, 36 (1959).
Compare the differing views as to the significance of Byrd expressed in Arrow-
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ness limited the impact of the opinion as a seminal modification of
the "outcome" test and clouded the general issue of when a state
law must govern.74
Thus, the federal rules were still threatened with subversion by
state law when the Hanna decision was rendered. That decision
held the application of the Erie test inapposite to a conflict between
the federal rules and state law. The Court ruled that while Erie
and the Enabling Act both proscribed federal invasion of statecreated "substantive" rights, they established distinct tests for
determining whether this restriction is contravened.75 In resolving
a conflict between the rules and state law, the issue to the Hanna
court was riot whether the rule in question was "substantive" or
"procedural," or whether "affirmative countervailing considerations" are to be assessed. Rather, the inquiry was to focus on whether
a procedural rule so alters substantive rights as to transgress the
restrictions embodied in the Enabling Act's proviso that the rules
"shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive rights."76
The Court noted that the test developed by the post-Erie cases was
designed to determine only the "substance-procedure" characterization and is inapt as an interpretive technique for gauging the
strictures of the Enabling Act.77 The federal courts have been insmith v. United Press Intl, 820 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), by Judge Friendly, writing for
the majority, id. at 230, and Judge Clark, dissenting, id. at 235-86.
S4
everal subsequent cases rely solely upon the "outcome" test without reference
to Byrd. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Smith, 286 F.2d 81, 82 (10th Cir. 1961); Aponte v.
American Sur. Co., 276 F.2d 678, 680 (1st Cir. 1960); Summers v. Wallace Hosp.
276 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1960); Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F.2d 522, 524 (5th
Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 863 U.S. 207 (1960); Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268
F.2d 857, 364 (2d Cir. 1959); Conn v. Young, 267 F.2d 725, 728 (2d Cir. 1959); Tarbert
v. Ingraham Co., 190 F. Supp. 402, 404-05 (D. Conn. 1960).
The majority of courts that have had occasion to consider Byrd have applied it to
the distribution of functions between judge and jury. See, e.g., Dill v. Scuka, 279 F.2d
145, 147 (Sd Cir. 1960); Walker v. United States ,Gypsum Co., 270 F.2d 857-60, 862
n.12 (4th Clr. 1959). However, some courts have extended Byrd beyond this limited
context. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508-15 (2d Cir. 1960);
Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1960); lovino v. Waterson,
274 F.2d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, Carlin v. Iovino, 862 U.S. 949 (1960). See
generally Smith, supra note 60, at 454-65.
15 880 U.S. at 471.
8
8Federal Rules Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
7 380 U.S.
at 471.
By liberating the federal rules from outcome-oriented post-Erie definitions of
"substance" and "procedure" and reverting to the orthodox definitional approach
typified by Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), the Court has failed to
delineate an adequate standard for interpreting the requirements of the Enabling
Act. Sibbach formulated the test as "whether a rule really regulates procedure,
-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
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structed by Congress to apply the federal rules and may refuse to do
so only if "the Advisory Committee,... [the Supreme] Court, and
Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the rule in question trinsgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor consti' 78
tutional restrictions.
Thus, the threat posed to the rules by the "outcome" test is
ameliorated by simply removing them from the ambit of that test
and by substituting a broad command to apply the rules regardless
of the resulting conflict between federal and state adjudication of
state-created rights. The Court indicated that this command is
limited not only by the language of the statute but also by the dictates of the Constitution. 9 However, the Court's interpretation of
the constitutional authorization for the federal rules reduces these
limitations to virtual meaninglessness. Unless a congressional determination that a matter is procedural is so clearly erroneous as to
be "irrational" that determination is conclusive.8 0 Such a finding
is so improbable that the rules, for all practical purposes, have been
made unchallengeable unless certain vague dicta are given substance
in future cases.81
and for disregard or infraction of them." Ibid. Such a generalization provides, at
best, minimal criteria for determining the question. See generally Driver, supra
note 54, at 72; Tunks, supra note 58, at 277. Lower federal courts are thus
faced with a variety of founts from which to derive characterizations of sub.
stance and procedure, with little indication of a test the Court would deem
preferable. The Court specifically cites Sibbach, 380 U.S. at 470-71, with its adoption
of the traditional conflict of laws demarcation, Note, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 560, 561-62 &
n.15 (1961), and thereby, arguably, implies that this definition is the one to be
utilized in determining whether a rule is "procedural." However, the Court deems
permissible any rule "rationally capable of classification," 380 U.S. at 472, as procedure; the implication being that if the rule would be "procedural" under any possible definition of "procedure" it would be within congressional authority. The latter
interpretation would appear to comport with the tenor of the decision which grants
the widest possible scope to the application of federal law by the federal courts.
78 380 U.S. at 471.
79 Id. at 471-72.

80 InHanna the Court stated that article III, §§ 1-2 of the Constitution, augmented
by the necessary and'proper clause, U. S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8 (18), not only grants Congress
the power to establish procedural rules for the federal courts, but also confers the power
to determine the proper classification of matter "which, though falling within the
uncertain area between substance and procedure... [is] rationally capable of classification as either ...

."

380 U.S. at 472. Thus the only judicial check upon con-

gressional discretion is when the classification made it so arbitrary as to be "irrational."
81
While the Court appears to be establishing a rather inflexible command to apply
the federal rules in all cases, some of the language in the Court's concluding paragraph
appears to leave the door open for later qualification. "Thus, though a court, in
measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and
the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to which the Rule makes
the character and result of the federal litigation stray from the course it would follow
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THE "OuTcoME"

TEST VITIATED

The uniform application of the federal rules, as pre-Hanna experience demonstrated, is essential for optimum efficiency in the.
federal court system and does not appear to be inconsistent with the
constitutional restrictions on Congress' legislative power over statecreated rights. The probability that Hanna will enable Congress
to seriously impinge upon the law-making functions of the states
through the guise of "procedural" rules would seem to be, at best,
slight.8 2 Nevertheless the inevitable result of the Court's holding
in state courts, Sibbach v. Wilson & Co ... [312 US. 1, 13-14 (1941)] it cannot be
forgotten that the Erie rule... [was] created to serve another purpose altogether. To
hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters
the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over federal procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that
power in the Enabling Act." 380 U.S. at 473-74. This statement, taken in isolation,
may imply that the federal rules are not to be wholly isolated from the Erie test.
Rather, the evil is mechanical application of that test in such a way that every
federal rule-state law conflict is resolved in favor of state law. A similar approach
was used in Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 822 F.2d 759, 764-65 (5th Cir.
1963); D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F-2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958), 34 NoTRE
DAME LAw. 130 (1958), 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 332 (1959), cited with approval in Hanna,
380 U.S. at 472-73. Hanna could thus be interpreted as merely engrafting upon the
outcome test a strong, but rebuttable, presumption in favor of the application of the
federal rules. See generally Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1
F.R.D. 417, 421 (1941) (advocating a presumption in favor of the rules). Cf. note 51
supra.

Moreover, the decision provides a ready ground for distinction for a lower court
which desires to avoid the application of a rule. While both the district and circuit
courts had held that the "outcome" test demanded the application of the state rule,
the Supreme Court said: "it is doubtful that.., the Erie rule would have obligated
the District Court to follow the Massachusetts procedure." 380 U.S. at 466. First,
using a Byrd-type analysis, there was no actual conflict between the policies underlying the two rules: the policy of guaranteeing actual notice to the defendant is the
common goal of both the federal and Massachusetts rules. Id. at 462 n.l. For an interpretation of the policies behind the Massachusetts requirement see Parker v. Rich, 297
Mass. 111, 113-14, 8 N.E.2d 845, 347 (1937). Secondly, under the Court's redrafted
"Erie test," see text accompanying notes 82-94 infra, the effect upon outcome produced
by the application of the federal rule would not be sufficient to necessitate the utilization of the state rule. 380 U.S. at 469. Such a situation not only reduces the necessity and value of finding further grounds for applying the federal rules, but provides
a lower court, when confronted with a case in which the application of a rule would
produce a substantial enough conflict with state procedure, a convenient distinction.
82 Of the existing federal rules, rule 23 (b) is perhaps most vulnerable to the
argument that it usurps state legislative prerogatives. The rule provides: "In an action
brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders . . .
the complaint... shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of
the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law . . . . The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the
efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure
to obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort." Fmn. R. Civ. P. 28 (b).
The existence of an additional state requirement for shareholder derivative suits,
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is to guarantee greater federal control over diversity suits. However, so long as the "outcome" test retains its vitality, this increased
federal control is diametrically opposed to the established federal
policy favoring the application of state law in such suits. Therefore,
in an extensive dictum, the Supreme Court completed its renovation of the federal choice of law problem by substantially reformulating the Erie-York test.88 The Court stated that, henceforth, the
"outcome" test is to be applied only as it relates to the twin aims of
Erie: "discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws. '8 4 The mere fact that the
application of the state rule would put an end to the litigation while
the federal law would not is insufficient per se to demand the
application of the state rule. Rather, the determinative fact is
whether such a conflict would affect the plaintiff's choice of forum.
Thus, the fact that a suit would be barred in the state courts is
relevant only if it was so barred at the time of filing in the federal
court.8 5 In addition, Hanna invalidates the underlying premise of
such as the posting of security for payment of expenses in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., can always be reconciled as being outside the scope of the rule and
thus capable of concurrent application. See 380 U.S. at 470 & n.12. The application of
an additional federal requirement can also be justified on the grounds that (1) such
application does not substantially alter the enforcement of state-created rights, cf.
Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167 (D. Conn. 1950); 2 BARRoN & HoLTzoFF, op. cit.

supra note 73, § 565; and (2) "the Erie doctrine does not require the federal courts to
entertain a suit, merely because such a suit might be brought in the state court."
WmGrr,op. cit. supra note 61, § 73, at 276 (1963).
Thus, this rule does not appear to seriously undermine the legislative functions
of the states. Certainly the effect upon those rights by any of the other rules would
be even less than that occasioned under rule 23 (b). See generally authorities cited
note 66 supra.
8
3See 380 U.S. at 466-69.
8,Id. at 468.
8
Id. at 468-69. Under the "outcome" test there were two aspects of the "doordosing" doctrine. The suit might be barred in the state court prior to the filing of
the complaint in the federal court. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535-36
(1949); See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. at 107. In this situation, the plaintiff
knows or may reasonably be assumed to know that he could not bring suit in the state
court and thus if his suit is allowed by the federal courts there will be an obvious
circumvention of state law. This situation would demand the application of state
law under the Hanna test, though not because of its "outcome-determinative" nature.
Rather, state law would apply in order to preclude the possibility of forum-shopping.
380 U.S. at 467-69. The second aspect of "door-closing" arises when access to the state
courts is barred subsequent to the commencement of the suit in the federal court.
See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949) (state
statute of limitation tolled after complaint filed in federal court but before summons
served). In this situation, the plaintiff cannot be assumed to anticipate that the
suit could not have been successfully brought in the state court, and he is not necessarily engaging in forum-shopping to avoid the state law which bars his suit. Under
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the "outcome" test by positing that the federal courts in all cases
are an independent judicial system, not mere adjuncts of state
courts.8 6 The thrust of the holding would therefore appear to
presage a more unfettered role for the federal courts in spheres
8 7
where federal and state law conflict
Yet the test propounded by Hanna appears to be as superficial
and prone to mechanical application as the "outcome" test it
ostensibly replaces. Certainly forum-shopping is neither per se
undesirable nor unconstitutional. 8 The Hanna decision itself, by
assuring the universal application of the federal rules throughout
the federal system, will promote forum-shopping. The Court does
not purport to proscribe all reasons for which a plaintiff might prethe test formulated by Hanna, the mere fact that the state courts are subsequently

closed to the plaintiff is not sufficient to require the application of state law. Rather,
for state law to apply, federal cognizance of the suit would have to result either in
unfair discrimination against a citizen-defendant or produce an undesirable reason
for forum-shopping. 380 US. at 466-69.
8
aId. at 472.
Independent coexistence of the federal judiciary may be extrapolated from the
constitutional and statutory power of the federal courts to apply an independent procedural system regardless of the resulting conflict with state enforcement of identical
"substantive" rights. This underlying philosophy was clearly enunciated in Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1963) (cited with approval in
Hanna). "We said in Monarch [Ins. Co.] v. Spach: 'Not the least of these countervailing considerations is the indispensible necessity that a tribunal, if it is to be an
independent court administering law, must have the capacity to regulate the manner
by which cases are to be tried and facts are to be presented in the search for the
truth of the cause ...
. Investment of this profound power and duty carries with
it the capacity if not the affirmative obligation, to prescribe such rules as will enable
the federal district courts to fulfill these constitutional demands without at the same
time trespassing upon others of equal and fundamental nature."' Id. at 764-65.
87 By guaranteeing the universal application of the federal rules and by liberalizing
the Erie test to allow application of federal law in the face of conflicting state law,
the Hanna decision will promote greater autonomy for federal courts and greater
scope for the development of federal common law. When this decision is coupled
with the expanding interpretation of "federal interest" questions, the scope given to
the federal courts and Congress to govern "substantive" rights becomes increasingly
clear. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Friendly, supra note 66, at
79-92; 1965 DuKE L.J. 828. See generally Textile Workers Union V. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
88
The primary reason for the establishment of diversity jurisdiction was to provide
an out-of-state litigant with a choice of forum. See Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 61, 87 (1809) (opinion of Marshall, C.J.); Herriott, Has Congress the Power to Modify the Effect of Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, 26 MARQ. L. REv.
1, 7 (1941). The Erie opinion itself, when viewed in the context of diversity jurisdiction, promotes forum-shopping by allowing a plaintiff to select the federal court
sitting in the state whose substantive rules are most favorable to his claim. See
CHEATHAM, CoNFurs OF LAws-CA E AND MATERIALS 235-36 (1964). Erie also affords
a plaintiff an opportunity to limit drastically the defendant's ability to argue an adverse state precedent on its merits by bringing suit in the federal courts. See Corbin,
The Laws of the Several Stdtes, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 774-75 (1941); Keefe, Gilhooley,
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fer the federal courts. Rather, the evils to be avoided are the use
of the federal courts to circumvent state policies in areas of state
law-making responsibility and the denial of due process to litigants
residing in the forum state. However, the phrase "forum-shopping"
is as susceptible of talismanic application as was "outcome-determination," thereby permitting the courts to determine the issue
without reference to the purpose of the restriction.89
Similarly, Hanna's "unfair discrimination" test fails to provide
an adequate yardstick. The venerable principle that equal administration of justice required decisional uniformity within a
state, once regarded as well-settled,9 0 has been modified in Hanna
to admit "nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations, between state and
federal litigation." 91 However, the Court's analysis fails to provide
adequate criteria for determining what constitutes a substantial
enough variation to warrant classification as "unfair discrimination." In fact, the Court's language seems to indicate that unless
the variation in the character of result of the litigation was such
as to cause the out-of-state plaintiff to choose the federal court instead of the state court, it would not constitute sufficient discrimination. 92 Therefore, since the Court has failed to provide adequate
analytical guidelines for "unfair discrimination," the lower federal
courts are likely to rely on the analogous "forum-shopping" test.
This in turn increases the danger of a return to a mechanical, shortBailey &-Day, supra note 55, at 518-19; Quigley, Congressional Repair of the Erie
Derailment, 60 MICH. L. R1r. 1031, 1036 (1962). Cf. Graves v. Associated Transport,
Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1965), in which the court said that where there was no
state authority "squarely in point" the federal court must decide the case as it
believed "it would be decided by the highest court" of the state. Id. at 896.
8, While Hanna restricts the "forum-shopping" test so as not to take into account
"nonsubstantial or trivial" variations between federal and state rules, 380 U.S. at
468, the danger exists that the courts will utilize the phrase mechanically and lose
sight of this restriction by not analyzing the reason for the "forum-shopping." This
mechanistic pitfall is precisely the difficulty presented by the "outcome" test. See note
85 supra. Compare Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), with Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer ScWarehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
00 See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949); Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 US. 487, 496 (1941), 41 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1403, 40 MICH. L.
REv. 126, 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 95, 16"TuL. L. Rnv. 141, 8 U. Pirr. L. REv. 60, 28 VA. L.
REI. 279, holding that equal administration of justice required decisional uniformity
within a state.
91380 U.S. at 467-68.
"9"Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial variations not likely to raise the sort
of equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also unlikely
to influence the choice of forum." 380 U.S. at 468. See id. at 468 n.9, 469. Cf. McCoid,
supra note 51, at 896.
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hand test,93 the unworkability of which prompted the Hanna decision. 94

While the Hanna decision succeeds in eliminating the threat
to the federal rules created by Erie and its progeny, the decision
fails to provide a workable judicial line of demarcation between the
overlapping and often conflicting spheres of power of the federal
and state governments. Thus, future friction and consequent
reformulation appear inevitable, especially in view of the failure of
the Court to delineate with precision the outlines of the reformulated Erie test and the requisite constitutional shackles which confine the tentacles of federal interest.
98 See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
g1

See notes 60-82 supra and accompanying text.

